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Abstract 
Research has posited profound questions regarding governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and most of these 
questions are focused on political practices. Therefore, several research agendas, including that of the 
current paper, have focused on understanding complex governance phenomenon, such as state 
corruption. I will address the following research questions: How do we explain the cultural properties 
inherent in state corruption in African political regimes? What are the complexities within the rational
‘interest’ and the cultural ‘normativity’ while explaining state corruption as an organised crime in 
African governmentality? Which factors are we failing to understand? In this paper, I engage a relational 
analytical approach that integrates the notion of motivation (including interest, greed, and grievance) as 
well as the process of cultural production and reproduction of corrupt practices, particularly in Uganda. 
First, I seek to explain that the type of politics and environment wherein such politics are manifested 
define the context and extent of corruption as well as the regime’s commitment to its prevention. Second, 
and most importantly, the rules, experiences, routines, and taken-for-granted practices that characterise 
the structure of a specific polity produce and reproduce a culturally corrupt system wherein people do 
not question the authoritative figures and are perpetually ruled over.




are seemingly controlled by its existence in political regime configurations (in connection with other 
components of political life, such as militarism). 
To understand security and political participation in Uganda, attention may be directed toward
exogenous determinants (such as regional insecurity spill-overs, the global flow of events, such as 
international organised crimes, terrorism discourses, and the negative role of international humanitarian 
interventions), but we ought to turn our focus to the internal factors (the state and regimes). The issues 
related to state corruption are intertwined with general state bureaucratic and administrative practices as 
majorly top-bottom constructions. This top-bottom system introduces patriarchy as a point of reference 
in the complex relationship of the regime with the state. Bose (2012) noted that corruption is as old as 
the formation of governments; although other commentators may point to the beginning of human nature 
because they consider all humans to be inherently corrupt. In particular, corruption is nurtured, and the 
state and regimes are the primary architects constructing the existential magnitude as well as the extent 
of its prevention. Therefore, it offers the rationale for the consolidation/protection of the regime.  
Although the presidential anti-corruption walk conducted on 4 December 2019, may have been 
planned with good intentions of creating awareness, there is widespread agreement that Ugandans have 
experienced a state-induced corruption scenario, either as victims or perpetrators, or have at least heard 
about it in recent days. For example, state bureaucratic corruption (wherein public and civil services are 
sold to the highest bidder through extortion and bribery [rent-seeking]), and political corruption 
(wherein politicians buy votes through contributions to weddings, funerals, or even directly provide 
cash, food, drinks, and clothes to voters to gain or maintain political offices) are considered normal 
practices and the effects are understood by those living within this context. Once they receive access to 
power, some politicians solicit kickbacks in the form of bribery and other grafts as compensatory 
gratification, whereas other politicians are involved in corrupt activities to maintain their power. 
Similarly, presidential political appointments to patronage cadres as tokens of appreciation for political 
allegiance is also a suitable example. 
Clientelism in patrimonial states is another common practice leading to the production of elements 
of personalised politics that distort the efficacy of bureaucratic practices and may curtail participatory 
regime change in affected nation-states, such as Uganda. Clientelism endures because the masses are
excluded from politics; power is the monopoly of a small group in the patron-client circle who will fight 
tooth and nail to preserve the patron’s position in the political spectrum (Hadjor 1993:66). Behind this 
patron-client façade lies the neo-colonial elements of power usurpation (Haynes 1996:30), which is a 
form of corruption. Therefore, it is unsurprising because post-colonial Ugandan rulers picked a leaf from 
colonial methods of power consolidation. For European colonialists, consolidation indicated that all 
positions of influence remained occupied by the European patrons. Similarly, for Ugandan rulers, 
survival in politics necessitates a trust network of kinsmen and close cronies. 
 
1. Introduction  
Compliance and non-compliance to state reforms are the major challenges of governance that the Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) states have yet to address. Despite the trajectory of political transitions from 
authoritarianism to imagined democratic governmentality, Uganda continues to be characterised by high 
levels of corruption, lack of government accountability, poor institutional practices, tight controls over 
state-spending information, and poor application of jurisprudence. These challenges have facilitated 
complex state-society relations that may necessitate clear conceptualisation of state corruption. This 
may serve as the basis for examining significant socio-political concerns, such as authoritarianism, a 
shrinking political space for dissent, and impracticable African development. This background 
facilitates knowledge of bureaucratic orientations in complicated corrupt states. This is the primary 
justification for supporting a strong commitment to research agendas prioritising the corruption-related 
problems of governance.  
The Ugandan presidential anti-corruption walk that was conducted on 4 December 20191 in Kampala 
city, forced intellectuals to ponder the following question: ‘Who is chasing who?’ It may be perceived 
as a rat chasing its own tail. Therefore, we must rethink the definition of manifestations of corruption 
and its relationship with the politics of regime consolidation. Why was it considered normal that traffic 
and free movement within Kampala city was restricted on 4 December 2019 for a presidential walk? 
Who accounts for the government resources—human or otherwise—that were used on that day? Whose 
funds were used to buy and print the t-shirts used by those participating in the walk? How accountable 
is the presidency in itself? To address these simple yet puzzling questions, we must first examine how 
we analyse and use corruption as a concept in African politics and governance spheres.   
In this paper, I explain the intricate ramifications related to corruption as an aid for accessing and 
consolidating political power. How does state corruption become entangled in the issue of regime 
continuity in Uganda? Today, while engaging in governance complexities—including regime change 
and consolidation as well as security—rampant in Uganda and other corruption-ridden nation-states, we 
mention their association with patronage edifices. Similar to most white-collar crimes, corruption 
sometimes victimises people indirectly and without the victims’ knowledge (Green and Ward 2004). 
When corruption becomes a routine issue, non-corruption transforms into defiance, which has notable 
governmental implications. From the perspectives of the rulers and the ruled, the causes and effects of 
corruption are ambiguous, trivial, and a way of life in a dysfunctional society. Therefore, the topic of 
elevating corruption studies to the level of a study field has remained disregarded. Increased attention 
toward corruption may unlock the potential steps for assessing more significant security phenomena that 
 
1 AFP coverage of Uganda’s Museveni leading a Much-derided Walk Against Graft on 4 December 2019. 
<https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ugandas-museveni-leads-much-derided-walk-against-graft-20191204-2/ 
Accessed on 10 December 2019>. 
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1 AFP coverage of Uganda’s Museveni leading a Much-derided Walk Against Graft on 4 December 2019. 
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may be satisfied with data indicating the most corrupt country and the reason for this judgement.
However, there are two prominent challenges in this ambition. First, the dilemma regarding whether we 
want to compare states or focus on a specific state. If comparison is necessary, would an intra-state 
comparison of political regime performance provide the best analytical portrayal? Is it rewarding to 
categorise corruption as high or low level? How did we create this threshold? Is it easy to have a 
universally accepted yardstick to objectively measure the variables and the extent of corruption? 
Although I appreciate their contribution as a mission to increase empiricism for an effective definition 
and law enforcement, the valuation of corruption and drawing lines to determine the extent of corruption 
may be a daunting task. This economic approach can lead to the misconception of corruption. First, it 
may not be easy to attach an economic value to patronage or trust networks. The construction of a 
patron-based web is sometimes an unconscious process that the parties may be unaware of. Second, 
even if we wished to quantify them, acts of corruption always remain so clandestine that only the 
exposed cases are brought to the public eye. Valuation and quantification only serve to make a case 
clear in terms of legal processes, but may not conclusively assert the concept in itself. 
On the other hand, some spectators advance the relativity of the concept of state corruption. For 
example, an African graduate student from Doshisha University in Japan commented (during the same 
conference at Kansai University) that we must acknowledge the context of a specific state while 
discussing corruption. For example, in some countries, corruption acts involving an amount lower than 
the specific amount cannot be regarded as corruption. He concluded that in the process of defining 
corruption, similar to that of democracy, we must include adjectives, such as ‘most corrupt’ and ‘least 
corrupt’, based on datasets suggesting the standard statistical measurement. He also expressed irritability 
regarding the relationship between regime longevity and state corruption because the period of 
continued political power does not necessarily imply corruption. Such intellectual debates may attempt 
to decouple corruption from political formations while engaging problematic statistical inferences. They 
attempt to portray the notion that the state is in control. However, such research ambitions—as explained 
by Jones (2009:10)—are bound to a development economy. The research project funders, line ministries, 
and other development partners are the entry points for most statistical research regarding development.
The resulting perception is one wherein the state and international society understand and attempt to 
mitigate excesses of corruption through government policies. This article posits questions regarding 
such puzzling ambiguities.
In many post-colonial African states wherein the western bureaucratic political order embedded 
patrimonial legacies, the result was/is the quest to maintain the grip on power and predation of scarce 
resources. The best examples of such regimes are Seseko Mobutu of former Zaire, Daniel Alap-Moi of 
Kenya, Milton Obote, and Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and other active 
regimes in power, some of which pose personal security issues for academic analysts. Kandil (2016) 
In terms of causation, the causes of corruption may be exogenous to some extent, but the extent to 
which endogenous factors inherent in the political systems can better explain the causation and 
damaging effect of this reality. Is it true that corruption and patrimonial politics cement regimes, thereby 
curtailing regime change? Although corruption can facilitate regime change through anti-corruption 
rhetoric and movements, it can also consolidate the regime by strengthening the reciprocal syndicates 
of the patriarchy. This analysis disregards the external relations that shaped every nation-state. I share 
the same perspective as that of Tilly regarding the processes of war- and state-making as an organised 
crime. In his analysis of the European nation-state formation—a situation that seems familiar to African 
nation-states—Tilly (1985:169) noted:  
A portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears 
a much greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social 
contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services 
to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth 
a certain kind of government. 
Research has yet to provide an explanation regarding how the creation and sustenance of a strong 
patron-based regime and a submissive state significantly depends on the holders of power in a political 
system, wherein corruption is already well knitted by the nation’s brutal history and existential 
difficulties related to human rights abuse. Corruption scholars must also seek to integrate cultural 
explanations while focusing on state corruption.  
2.  Corruption and regime consolidation  
During a presentation of this paper at the first Japan Society for Afrasian Studies (JSAS) conference 
that was conducted at Kansai University in 2018, I experienced an academic engagement with Professor 
Yoichi Mine, an economics professor at Doshisha University Japan, and Dr. Pedro Miguel Amakasu 
Raposo, an economic researcher at Kansai University in Japan, regarding the issue of the quantification 
of corruption. This quantification debate is supported by the attempts of governmental policies and civil 
societies to explain the current state of affairs related to corruption. One such narrative is the government 
anti-corruption agency of the Inspector General of Government (IGG) in Uganda that categorises 
corruption cases into two types: grand and petty corruption. According to the IGG, any case of 
corruption involving a figure beyond the threshold of one billion Uganda shillings is considered high-
level corruption and is thus investigated by a special directorate in the IGG’s office2. Professor Mine 
2 NBS TV (2017) hosting the deputy IGG, George Bamugemereire. Is the Fight Against Corruption Pure 
Rhetoric? <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mn8kUF4SY30/ Accessed on 20 September 2019>. 
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occupied by their political cronies to increase their political support3.   
The conceptualisation of corruption as a state crime lies beyond patriarchy. Michalowski and Kramer 
(2007) characterised it as illegal or a socially injurious action resulting from a mutually reinforcing 
interaction between the policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of parties in institutions of 
political government. In NTV’s mini-documentary regarding the rise and fall of Abdallah Kitatta, a 
respondent clarified, ‘don’t you know that power is superior to the law? (adding that) people who have 
fenced off your land have the power…’4. Such phenomena of corruption and their environment can be 
perceived as concentric circles whose basic forms are located at the centre of power (Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan 2006). Such basic forms are integrated into the increasingly complex strategies of actors and 
the context to create a routinised corrupt practice. Such practices through routine functioning in public 
or civil service offices become embedded in a series of recurrent socio-political and economic contexts. 
Accuracy can be achieved through a multidimensional approach because corruption may be perceived 
through a minimal command of two languages—the languages of official rules and informal practices.    
In criminological and economics schools, corruption is typified as a rational action based on the 
motivation and demotivation of actors. For example, Green and Ward (2004:13–18) defined corruption 
in different categories, such as corruption as the means, as tolerated, and as an organisational goal. 
Although state corruption can be characterised as a motivation, such categorisation only answers a part 
of the corruption question if it ignores the embedded norms accrued in the processes of strategic 
interaction. Corruption is learned through on-the-job experience, which is a progressive process 
involving initiation, adaptation, and assimilation into this learning process, starting from the formative 
years of the colonial African states. The configurations of such ‘African social logics’ (Haug 2012:36), 
current patterned life, and the historical context naturally drag the political patriarchy-dominated state 
into the conceptual clarity of corruption.  
 
3. Decentralisation and the predatory nature of regimes 
The decentralisation system introduced soon after Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance 
Movement/Army (NRM/A) war served in two capacities: First, in agreement with Professor Takeuchi 
that it was a system intended to extend the patronage down to the grassroots. Second, to create a new 
system through which public services would be channelled to strengthen the grip on power. Amaza—
one of the 1981–86 revolutionaries—explained the same scheme as a political consolidation project, 
 
3 In a discussion with Professor Shinichi Takeuchi, decentralisation (increasing the number of districts and 
county constituencies through which the political allegiance is channeled) was a political card intended to extend 
the political patronage and was not based on service delivery as the policy claims. It was intended to provide 
political positions for their cronies and increase the legislative constituents through which legislations can be 
made in favor of the existing regime’s consolidation. 
4 NTV Uganda 2019. ‘The rise and fall of Abdallah Kitatta’. NTV Panorama, Updated on 10 February 2019. 
Video. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-fdqDIoyguY/ Accessed on 18 November 2020>. 
stated that in a deliberate quest to amass popular support, the masses must be mobilised and organised. 
Therefore, coup leaders devote themselves to building reliable patron-based political institutions during 
and in the aftermath of war (Finer 1962:164–65). The most meaningful element of institutions built on 
this ideology is that they appropriate supporters through a mixture of patronage, clientelistic alliances, 
and sometimes systematic intimidation (Decalo 1998:48–49, Kandil 2016). Warlord regimes (such as 
those in Uganda) achieve this mixture by first dismantling the social structures of the previous regimes 
that were labelled as bad regimes and creating loyal institutions, including trade unions, professional 
associations, and religious groups. Through such loyal institutions, warlord regimes recruit members in 
their political networks. The patronage-created networks work parallel to the pre-existing, pre-war 
system but form an elaborate construction of control apparatus to eliminate threats to the regime 
(Puddington 1988:1), thus a section of the pre-existing network soon assimilates, whereas a sizeable 
portion shrinks to non-existence.    
To achieve popular support, the regimes must embark on organising a mass movement based on their 
ideological rhetoric of political business within highly structured patron-state institutions. This mass 
movement involves the creation of a single-party system that does not starkly differ from the post-1986 
war in Uganda and the post-1994 genocide politics in Rwanda. According to Kandil (2016:58), ‘where 
the locus of power rested with a mass-mobilising ruling party that is charged with directing all aspects 
of social life’, consolidation thus becomes an obvious outcome. Regimes have employed this model, 
and it has resulted in an exceptionally effective penetration of after-war hopeless constituents, thereby 
embedding its endurance in the political life of such unsuspecting constituents (Nordlinger 1977:18). 
Members of the ruling regime infiltrate crucial state/governmental offices to achieve complete 
consolidation. This is a tool used to block dissidence or the rise of other opposing political forces (Arendt
1951:419–20). Specific to this type of institutional arrangement, the warlord-based patron military is 
transformed into an administrative arm of the regime, and as Odom (1978:41–44) stated, ‘not something 
separate from and competing with it’.   
Although Kandil (2016) stated that the organisation of masses around revolutionary patriarchy and 
the assertion of bureaucratic pressure for their consolidation are two alternative options at the disposal 
of an authoritarian regime, there is no harm in their concurrent application. Risk-cautious warlord rulers 
may throw their weight behind the bureaucratic processes, including manipulation of the constitution 
and constitutionalism. The constitutional process in Uganda since independence from colonial rule has 
served as an example of a bureaucratic strain on change and in favour of the consolidation of regimes. 
This powerful force matches the anti-dissidence attitudes and overt political arrogance and/or reluctance 
among government officials. According to Nordlinger, the regime typically assumes that ‘their control 
of state institutions is sufficient to accomplish their goals’ (1977:114). To consolidate their survival, 
regimes join their overwhelming control over the bureaucratic apparatus with a multitude of offices 
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involving initiation, adaptation, and assimilation into this learning process, starting from the formative 
years of the colonial African states. The configurations of such ‘African social logics’ (Haug 2012:36), 
current patterned life, and the historical context naturally drag the political patriarchy-dominated state 
into the conceptual clarity of corruption.  
 
3. Decentralisation and the predatory nature of regimes 
The decentralisation system introduced soon after Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance 
Movement/Army (NRM/A) war served in two capacities: First, in agreement with Professor Takeuchi 
that it was a system intended to extend the patronage down to the grassroots. Second, to create a new 
system through which public services would be channelled to strengthen the grip on power. Amaza—
one of the 1981–86 revolutionaries—explained the same scheme as a political consolidation project, 
 
3 In a discussion with Professor Shinichi Takeuchi, decentralisation (increasing the number of districts and 
county constituencies through which the political allegiance is channeled) was a political card intended to extend 
the political patronage and was not based on service delivery as the policy claims. It was intended to provide 
political positions for their cronies and increase the legislative constituents through which legislations can be 
made in favor of the existing regime’s consolidation. 
4 NTV Uganda 2019. ‘The rise and fall of Abdallah Kitatta’. NTV Panorama, Updated on 10 February 2019. 
Video. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-fdqDIoyguY/ Accessed on 18 November 2020>. 
stated that in a deliberate quest to amass popular support, the masses must be mobilised and organised. 
Therefore, coup leaders devote themselves to building reliable patron-based political institutions during 
and in the aftermath of war (Finer 1962:164–65). The most meaningful element of institutions built on 
this ideology is that they appropriate supporters through a mixture of patronage, clientelistic alliances, 
and sometimes systematic intimidation (Decalo 1998:48–49, Kandil 2016). Warlord regimes (such as 
those in Uganda) achieve this mixture by first dismantling the social structures of the previous regimes 
that were labelled as bad regimes and creating loyal institutions, including trade unions, professional 
associations, and religious groups. Through such loyal institutions, warlord regimes recruit members in 
their political networks. The patronage-created networks work parallel to the pre-existing, pre-war 
system but form an elaborate construction of control apparatus to eliminate threats to the regime 
(Puddington 1988:1), thus a section of the pre-existing network soon assimilates, whereas a sizeable 
portion shrinks to non-existence.    
To achieve popular support, the regimes must embark on organising a mass movement based on their 
ideological rhetoric of political business within highly structured patron-state institutions. This mass 
movement involves the creation of a single-party system that does not starkly differ from the post-1986 
war in Uganda and the post-1994 genocide politics in Rwanda. According to Kandil (2016:58), ‘where 
the locus of power rested with a mass-mobilising ruling party that is charged with directing all aspects 
of social life’, consolidation thus becomes an obvious outcome. Regimes have employed this model, 
and it has resulted in an exceptionally effective penetration of after-war hopeless constituents, thereby 
embedding its endurance in the political life of such unsuspecting constituents (Nordlinger 1977:18). 
Members of the ruling regime infiltrate crucial state/governmental offices to achieve complete 
consolidation. This is a tool used to block dissidence or the rise of other opposing political forces (Arendt
1951:419–20). Specific to this type of institutional arrangement, the warlord-based patron military is 
transformed into an administrative arm of the regime, and as Odom (1978:41–44) stated, ‘not something 
separate from and competing with it’.   
Although Kandil (2016) stated that the organisation of masses around revolutionary patriarchy and 
the assertion of bureaucratic pressure for their consolidation are two alternative options at the disposal 
of an authoritarian regime, there is no harm in their concurrent application. Risk-cautious warlord rulers 
may throw their weight behind the bureaucratic processes, including manipulation of the constitution 
and constitutionalism. The constitutional process in Uganda since independence from colonial rule has 
served as an example of a bureaucratic strain on change and in favour of the consolidation of regimes. 
This powerful force matches the anti-dissidence attitudes and overt political arrogance and/or reluctance 
among government officials. According to Nordlinger, the regime typically assumes that ‘their control 
of state institutions is sufficient to accomplish their goals’ (1977:114). To consolidate their survival, 
regimes join their overwhelming control over the bureaucratic apparatus with a multitude of offices 
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The decentralisation problems in Uganda are the projects intended to systematically extend political 
patronage through the transmission of the NRM’s idea of state capture. To ensure NRM maintains power, 
no stone must remain unturned. 
Government office allocations in such a patrimonial-bureaucratic crisis are deliberately politicised 
and corruptly administered. The regime deliberately charges different offices with overlapping, and 
sometimes identical tasks, to facilitate the smooth transfer of power between and among them. For 
example, each district has an LC5 chairperson elected by the people; however, there are other positions 
that assume a share of the LC5 chairperson’s powers and responsibilities, such as the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO) and the Resident District Commissioner (RDC). The CAO and the RDC 
are government employees whose actions and tenure can be determined by the appointing authority not 
very far from the regime elites. In most cases, appointments to such offices are treated as rewards for 
supporters of the ruling party, particularly the RDCs. Even among the elected local council chain, 
funding for their districts may be uncertain if their political perspectives oppose that of the regime. 
Therefore, as Kandil (2016) explained, the regime can easily liquidate the functions of certain 
government agencies and relegate others to the shadows of bureaucratic performance.  
This dilemma exists not only in decentralisation, but also in the central government. The regime 
asserts pressure to prevent bureaucrats from nurturing stable power bases that are likely to threaten the 
regime’s grip on power (Arendt 1951:401–404). The regime has discretionary power in the selection of 
 
5 The MOLG facts sheet can be obtained on 
<https://molg.go.ug/sites/default/files/MoLG%20-%20%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf/ Accessed on 10 February 2019>. 






January 1979 40 
May 1979 22 
August 1980 33 
15 March 1991 39 
20 March 1997 45 
28 November 2000 56 
1 July 2005 69 
1 July 2006 80 
1 July 2009 87 
1 July 2010 111 
1 July 2016 115 
1 July 2017 121 
citing the relationship between the National Resistance Council and the NRM/A (Amaza 1998:48–49). 
Tushabe (2013:152) explained that greed for power and control remains a notorious camouflage of 
decentralisation in Uganda.  
Museveni was not the first Ugandan president to engage in a decentralisation strategy. In 1974, Idi 
Amin introduced ten provincial governments and increased the number of districts from 19 to 37—a
clear example of the prebendalistic practices that are particularly common in Africa (Van de Walle 
2007). Therefore, granting the district status is a noted feature of Museveni’s rewards to his supporters 
and a reciprocal promise for political support of his regime. Tushabe deemed this the ‘politics of giving’ 
(2013: 156) wherein Museveni—the Chairman of High Command—presents himself as a giving dad in 
the revolutionary struggle. Similar to Idi Amin, Museveni’s district creation and the facilitation of five-
layered local administrative units, formerly Resistance Councils (RCs) 1–5 and later known as the Local 
Councils (LCs) 1–5, created patronage opportunities that paid-off in the subsequent elections. Unlike 
Idi Amin, President Museveni’s government has continued to subdivide districts at regular intervals to 
121 districts or more. 
The correlation does not always suggest positive outcomes regarding whether this massive 
subdivision of administrative units translates into effective and localised service delivery. Government 
officials have claimed that district creation helps to ensure enhanced service delivery in various areas, 
such as the construction of schools and roads, water, and electrification. However, there is no correlation 
between the creation of new districts and improved service delivery in Africa. During Museveni’s 
regime (hereafter NRM’s regime), service delivery must appear as the regimes’ reciprocity to its 
political strongholds or as a tool to weaken dissenting voices. As indicated by the President of Uganda, 
newly created districts often suffer inadequate staffing, with human resource levels at an average of 
approximately 55% of their full capacity and as low as 10% in many districts (Green 2015). Moreover, 
the effect of the dubious subdivision of local administrative units has subsequently implied that central 
government funding to districts is spread even thinner, thereby making it impossible to obtain substantial 
development. These factors are not particularly surprising, because there is strong evidence to prove 
that district creation has been driven by political and electoral calculations, rather than developmental 
requirements. Table 1 presents the evolution and chronology of political decentralisation in Uganda 
from the 1950s to 2017.  
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Museveni was not the first Ugandan president to engage in a decentralisation strategy. In 1974, Idi 
Amin introduced ten provincial governments and increased the number of districts from 19 to 37—a
clear example of the prebendalistic practices that are particularly common in Africa (Van de Walle 
2007). Therefore, granting the district status is a noted feature of Museveni’s rewards to his supporters 
and a reciprocal promise for political support of his regime. Tushabe deemed this the ‘politics of giving’ 
(2013: 156) wherein Museveni—the Chairman of High Command—presents himself as a giving dad in 
the revolutionary struggle. Similar to Idi Amin, Museveni’s district creation and the facilitation of five-
layered local administrative units, formerly Resistance Councils (RCs) 1–5 and later known as the Local 
Councils (LCs) 1–5, created patronage opportunities that paid-off in the subsequent elections. Unlike 
Idi Amin, President Museveni’s government has continued to subdivide districts at regular intervals to 
121 districts or more. 
The correlation does not always suggest positive outcomes regarding whether this massive 
subdivision of administrative units translates into effective and localised service delivery. Government 
officials have claimed that district creation helps to ensure enhanced service delivery in various areas, 
such as the construction of schools and roads, water, and electrification. However, there is no correlation 
between the creation of new districts and improved service delivery in Africa. During Museveni’s 
regime (hereafter NRM’s regime), service delivery must appear as the regimes’ reciprocity to its 
political strongholds or as a tool to weaken dissenting voices. As indicated by the President of Uganda, 
newly created districts often suffer inadequate staffing, with human resource levels at an average of 
approximately 55% of their full capacity and as low as 10% in many districts (Green 2015). Moreover, 
the effect of the dubious subdivision of local administrative units has subsequently implied that central 
government funding to districts is spread even thinner, thereby making it impossible to obtain substantial 
development. These factors are not particularly surprising, because there is strong evidence to prove 
that district creation has been driven by political and electoral calculations, rather than developmental 
requirements. Table 1 presents the evolution and chronology of political decentralisation in Uganda 
from the 1950s to 2017.  
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power directly controlled by President Museveni and his immediate cronies. 
Tilly (1985) presented the same dimensions that consider states as criminal enterprises. Tilly 
(1985:169) referred to the state as a form of protection racket, similar to organised criminals interested 
in effective predation. Protection is a term used to connote both the confrontation (the response to non-
compliance of the common people) and prevention of damage (violence), which is inspired by the strong 
arm of the state itself. Tilly stated that this economic observation of the state characterises its formation 
and consolidation. Other state-based analysts have noted that states provide protection against internal 
and external violence, and those that complain against the price of protection are deemed anarchists and 
subversive. However, according to Tilly, a ‘racketeer is someone who creates a threat and then charges 
for its reduction’ (1985:171). Although Tilly blinded himself regarding cultural considerations of state 
formation, he does not blatantly deny the cultural components of state formation and consolidation. 
Because he is aware of the foundations of the state being perceived as a form of punishment, Tilly must 
be informed about the state’s survival on a string of informal rules, symbols, rituals, and norms that 
form the major part of Uganda’s public culture. 
5. Literature and continued ignorance
The noteworthy literature on corruption is inspired by Radcliffe-Brown’s (1952) functionalism, as cited 
by Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006:18), which emphasised the study of the institutions and norms 
contributing to the stability and reproduction of social systems at the cost of analysis of corruption as a 
socially deviant reality. The structural functionalist Radcliffe-Brown emphasised the role of this 
phenomenon in the maintenance of society, which resonated with the French philosopher Durkheim.
Durkheim (1951) showed that once a deviant action, such as corruption, becomes a rule and non-
corruption an exception, the practice ceases to be perceived as a disorder and transforms into a norm 
responsible for perpetuating impunity. This has a negative implication on national security.  
Due to the emphasis presented by functionalists, such as Radcliffe-Brown, scholars and practitioners 
have opted for an easy alternative—the moralisation and acceptance of corruption as a trivial aspect of 
social inquiry. Corruption continues to affect citizenry in their daily lives, ranging from failure to access 
justice and rule of law, rampant horizontal and vertical inequalities, and limited access to quality health, 
education services, and other social and public amenities (Twinoburyo 2015), all of which double the
chances of lapsing and/or relapsing to violence. Twinoburyo (2015) argued that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
a vicious cycle and endogenous causalities may have created poverty traps, where weak states, predatory 
political regimes, generalised corruption, commodity-based market structures, and windfall gains 
reinforce each other. Therefore, corruption is a security hazard and not a functional element of an ideal 
society. Corruption, as an aid to regime consolidation, is equally damaging. 
However, in the Penal Code Act division ii (relating to offences against the administration of lawful 
institutional bureaucrats; typically, the transfers within and between governmental institutions are 
largely focused on curtailing dissenting voices. Interestingly, the politics around bureaucratic 
placements, transfers, and termination start with the regime patron, but over time, the middle managers 
also widen their network and carry the virtue of the mastermind surviving patron. However, a
contradiction has been noted regarding whether the middle managers are instrumentally clustered 
around the ambitions of the patron or are intend to maximise available crony-opportunities. In the 
eminent contradictions in the interpretation of the patron-bureaucratic relationship, the regime takes a 
notable share in their consolidation project.
4. State, state formation, and regime survival 
We must first conceptualise the state in its nature to understand the intricacies of the dubious state 
enterprise. For example, Skocpol (1979:27) defined the state as an administrative, policing, and military 
complex controlled by a well-coordinated executive authority—an autonomous political structure—
characterised by a structure with logic and interests of its own. Kandil (2016) added to this economic 
motive-based analysis of the state that cultural assets, such as myths, religious doctrines, ideologies, 
symbols, values, and norms, eventually find expression in the laws and practices and aid in legitimising
the existing political order.  
This mechanism noted in Skocpol and Kandil’s explanations also conditions subjects to accept and 
be mobilised when required for regime consolidation. Although Kandil acknowledged the existence of 
a cultural element in the consolidation of political order, he showed that regardless of noticeable cultural 
and economic assets in the ruling blocs, the governments and regimes entirely depend on coercive and 
political power. Kandil (2016) may have mistaken or perceived differently the processes leading to the 
consolidation of political power and coercive force, among which cultural components are vital. States, 
governments, and regimes do not only survive based on coercion and repression. The processes 
facilitating their consolidation depend on multifaceted dynamics (inclusive of corruption).  
The NRM regime, according to Khisa (2019:105), has been partly constructed on the ‘legal and 
engineering’ or what can be referred to as the ‘rule by the law’, instead of the rule of law. Rather than 
applying the rule of law, in states with webs of pervasive political corruption, control over the parliament 
is crucial for ensuring easy preservation of the regime. Khisa (2019) added that this is why consistent,
direct financial inducements have been provided to members of parliament to enable legal constitutional 
manipulation. This constitutional manipulation was noted in 2005, when the constitution was amended 
to remove the term limits without a referendum to allow President Museveni to contest again for the 3rd
and several subsequent terms of presidential tenure. Later (and most recently) in 2018, the constitution 
was successfully raided again for an amendment to scrap the age limit for the presidency. Many 
observers have perceived the state/government institutions as a centralised and personalised system of 
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subversive. However, according to Tilly, a ‘racketeer is someone who creates a threat and then charges 
for its reduction’ (1985:171). Although Tilly blinded himself regarding cultural considerations of state 
formation, he does not blatantly deny the cultural components of state formation and consolidation. 
Because he is aware of the foundations of the state being perceived as a form of punishment, Tilly must 
be informed about the state’s survival on a string of informal rules, symbols, rituals, and norms that 
form the major part of Uganda’s public culture. 
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by Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006:18), which emphasised the study of the institutions and norms 
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socially deviant reality. The structural functionalist Radcliffe-Brown emphasised the role of this 
phenomenon in the maintenance of society, which resonated with the French philosopher Durkheim.
Durkheim (1951) showed that once a deviant action, such as corruption, becomes a rule and non-
corruption an exception, the practice ceases to be perceived as a disorder and transforms into a norm 
responsible for perpetuating impunity. This has a negative implication on national security.  
Due to the emphasis presented by functionalists, such as Radcliffe-Brown, scholars and practitioners 
have opted for an easy alternative—the moralisation and acceptance of corruption as a trivial aspect of 
social inquiry. Corruption continues to affect citizenry in their daily lives, ranging from failure to access 
justice and rule of law, rampant horizontal and vertical inequalities, and limited access to quality health, 
education services, and other social and public amenities (Twinoburyo 2015), all of which double the
chances of lapsing and/or relapsing to violence. Twinoburyo (2015) argued that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
a vicious cycle and endogenous causalities may have created poverty traps, where weak states, predatory 
political regimes, generalised corruption, commodity-based market structures, and windfall gains 
reinforce each other. Therefore, corruption is a security hazard and not a functional element of an ideal 
society. Corruption, as an aid to regime consolidation, is equally damaging. 
However, in the Penal Code Act division ii (relating to offences against the administration of lawful 
institutional bureaucrats; typically, the transfers within and between governmental institutions are 
largely focused on curtailing dissenting voices. Interestingly, the politics around bureaucratic 
placements, transfers, and termination start with the regime patron, but over time, the middle managers 
also widen their network and carry the virtue of the mastermind surviving patron. However, a
contradiction has been noted regarding whether the middle managers are instrumentally clustered 
around the ambitions of the patron or are intend to maximise available crony-opportunities. In the 
eminent contradictions in the interpretation of the patron-bureaucratic relationship, the regime takes a 
notable share in their consolidation project.
4. State, state formation, and regime survival 
We must first conceptualise the state in its nature to understand the intricacies of the dubious state 
enterprise. For example, Skocpol (1979:27) defined the state as an administrative, policing, and military 
complex controlled by a well-coordinated executive authority—an autonomous political structure—
characterised by a structure with logic and interests of its own. Kandil (2016) added to this economic 
motive-based analysis of the state that cultural assets, such as myths, religious doctrines, ideologies, 
symbols, values, and norms, eventually find expression in the laws and practices and aid in legitimising
the existing political order.  
This mechanism noted in Skocpol and Kandil’s explanations also conditions subjects to accept and 
be mobilised when required for regime consolidation. Although Kandil acknowledged the existence of 
a cultural element in the consolidation of political order, he showed that regardless of noticeable cultural 
and economic assets in the ruling blocs, the governments and regimes entirely depend on coercive and 
political power. Kandil (2016) may have mistaken or perceived differently the processes leading to the 
consolidation of political power and coercive force, among which cultural components are vital. States, 
governments, and regimes do not only survive based on coercion and repression. The processes 
facilitating their consolidation depend on multifaceted dynamics (inclusive of corruption).  
The NRM regime, according to Khisa (2019:105), has been partly constructed on the ‘legal and 
engineering’ or what can be referred to as the ‘rule by the law’, instead of the rule of law. Rather than 
applying the rule of law, in states with webs of pervasive political corruption, control over the parliament 
is crucial for ensuring easy preservation of the regime. Khisa (2019) added that this is why consistent,
direct financial inducements have been provided to members of parliament to enable legal constitutional 
manipulation. This constitutional manipulation was noted in 2005, when the constitution was amended 
to remove the term limits without a referendum to allow President Museveni to contest again for the 3rd
and several subsequent terms of presidential tenure. Later (and most recently) in 2018, the constitution 
was successfully raided again for an amendment to scrap the age limit for the presidency. Many 
observers have perceived the state/government institutions as a centralised and personalised system of 
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accountability (Chêne 2014). Therefore, it is unjustifiable to conclude that corruption may not 
necessarily be an analytical problem (Twinoburyo 2015), and that it can be treated as an organ of a 
functional whole, as portrayed by functionalism. Kaufmann and Vincente (2011) showed that when 
there is high inequality (corruption is accountable in part) and the majority is receiving low income, the 
population may not have the power to threaten the elite with a successful insurrection. Therefore, the 
elites opt for the cheapest illegal forms of control of the power to ensure that the poor remain poorer. 
Although many scholars and practitioners have noted that state corruption is normal for the survival of 
society and a necessary component of life, the negative effects of state corruption are significant in 
impeding political development. There are numerous reasons to determine that state corruption is highly 
detrimental to the achievement of regime change. Therefore, corruption must be deemed increasingly 
problematic. 
6. From interest to culture in a revolutionary regime 
Until recent times, the issues associated with corruption have been typically legalistic, with total 
disregard of cultural properties in everyday politics. One notorious critique of the cultural explanation 
of corruption is cited from the works of Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006), who unwittingly cast 
doubt on the scientific credibility of corruption as an object of anthropological inquiry. Other scholars 
are focused on understanding the positioning of agency in the theorising process. Is state corruption an 
individual issue, societal issue, cultural issue, or natural phenomenon that human beings may have no 
control over? Choices regarding the analysis category among the mentioned placements of the agency 
may determine the thought process of the researcher. Rather than accepting an economic analytical 
blindfold, I analysed corruption as a consequence of mechanisms at play in political actions. The state 
capture by the regimes begins with state instrumentalisation intended to maintain political power and 
then transform through social networks, thereby embedding such practices and norms of the procedure. 
For example, when the president hands out money and free t-shirts to voters, it is not corruption but 
providence in the eyes of the voters. Moral incorrectness is less important because the most corrupt
people become the most cherished and respected members of society.
 Society considers the corrupt as successful. Within state institutions, if you are not in a corruptible 
position—otherwise known as wet offices—you may be lacking an outstanding social network. From 
my personal experiences, while I worked as a police detective at Makerere University, I was transferred 
from a location that was known to be a dry assignment due to its nature of cases (Makerere) to a location 
known to have the highest crime incidence (Kawempe). Many fellow officers told me that my new 
placement was highly lucrative, due to the high criminality, and was thus highly corruptible. I asked 
them whether high criminality meant high salaries, but they answered: ‘You know that police files mean 
sitrep’. Sitrep is an abbreviation for the ‘situational report’ in its obvious usage, but its figurative usage 
authority) (1950)6 and the Anti-Corruption Act (2009), especially part ii relating to the ingredients of 
corruption7, the legalities do not address the structural concerns of a state as a culprit. Legal definitions 
and implications disregard the cultural components of the state as a social being. These two legal 
frameworks (the Panel Code Act and the Anti-Corruption Act) consider the state as an institution of 
individuals bound by the laws. They position individuals as the culprits and the state as a victim, which 
is problematic. 
Other works have pointed toward corruption as a clash between the traditional and modern systems 
of governance. This argument implies that corruption goes hand-in-hand with societies undergoing rapid 
change, wherein the coexistence of different styles of political action exacerbates the gap between legal 
norms and pragmatic political action 8. Bayart (1993:39) demonstrated that corruption typifies the 
appropriation and re-appropriation of Western models of politics by African states.  
Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006:22) indicated that the shunning of corruption as a state crime in 
social inquiry may have been precipitated by its conception as being dangerously flirty with deep 
ethnocentrism. The analytical process has perceived corruption as a normative dysfunctionality and 
crisis in African states. According to Terray (1987), terms, such as corruption and nepotism, are verdicts 
based on the ethnocentric notion, and these terms become problematic only if they lead to inequalities 
in terms of jobs and wealth. Numerous studies have shown that in places wherein corruption is endemic, 
a high level of disparity is noted. Green and Ward (2004) concluded that corruption is increasingly 
pervasive in societies characterised by clientelism and patrimonialism, and such societies tend to have 
notable disparities between the rich few patrons and an impoverished majority. Therefore, the extent 
and penetration of state-organised crime/deviance depends on the degree of poverty and inequality. For 
example, in the Transparency international report, Zúñiga (2017) acknowledged the negative impact of 
corruption on the distribution of income through poor and selective tax policies that favour the rich at 
the detriment of the poor, tax evasion by the powerful few and clientelistic connections to the income 
access, all of which undermine the government’s capacity to ensure an increasingly equitable resource 
distribution. Regarding the corruption in the Philippines, Azfar and Gurgur (2005) noted that increased 
inequality caused by corruption exacerbates the position of the poor in society by reducing the resources 
available for social spending, such as education, food, and health. This equally affects people’s potential 
to make political claims.
Azfar and Gurgur (2005) showed that corruption is responsible for delays in health services and 
decreasing education standards for the poor. This blends in the worst type of structural inequality. This 
type of inequality ensures that people become increasingly poor and are thus unable to demand 
6 Penal Code Act 1950. <https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/120/ Accessed on 15 March 2019>.
7 Anti-Corruption Act 2009. <https://ulii.org/node/24728/ Accessed on 15 March 2019>.
8 Simon Ottenberg in his 1967 work on Local Government and the Law in Southern Nigeria. 
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accountability (Chêne 2014). Therefore, it is unjustifiable to conclude that corruption may not 
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example, in the Transparency international report, Zúñiga (2017) acknowledged the negative impact of 
corruption on the distribution of income through poor and selective tax policies that favour the rich at 
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6 Penal Code Act 1950. <https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/120/ Accessed on 15 March 2019>.
7 Anti-Corruption Act 2009. <https://ulii.org/node/24728/ Accessed on 15 March 2019>.
8 Simon Ottenberg in his 1967 work on Local Government and the Law in Southern Nigeria. 
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perceive their salaries as low, based on the standard of living they aspired for and their societal status. 
In the questionnaires administered to 434 state employees, 80% acknowledged the challenge of support 
for poor dependents other than their immediate families. This indicates that a regime whose foundation 
was focused on recruitment within what Tilly deems the trust networks, will likely employ through 
clientelistic and tribal lines. Employees will also attempt, to employ their relatives to reduce dependency, 
and unconsciously widen the patronage that becomes a vicious state crime, based on which the 
state/regime thrives.   
My argument is that there is a close relationship between the bureaucratic process and corruption. 
One of the respondents—a student at Makerere University—laboured to explain the culture of 
corruption in terms of power. She stated that corruption is focused on consistent access to authority or 
everyday control over the use of violence. She illustrated her claim by citing a high incidence of 
corruption in police, court, and less among government teachers. In this situation, people understand 
who has power over what should be done. Although the research points to deviance as being culturally 
embedded, few studies have indicated that corruption typifies an African political pathology (Blundo 
and Olivier de Sardan 2006). The emphasis in this article points to the fact that traditional cultures are 
not fertile grounds for the incubation of corruption in Africa. Rather, considerable focus is given to 
studies that understand state corruption as an act of routinised deviance producing practices of officers—
which are defined as a way of life. However, the fusion of modern state institutional practice—
bureaucracies—with the traditional patriarchies (the daddy—politics) could have invoked the cultural 
identity influence on the running of neo-patrimonial states in recent times. Bose (2012), in his aspects 
of bureaucratic corruption, illustrated the strong connection between governmental bureaucracies and 
corruption. He posited that the accurate analysis of corruption starts with government bureaucracies as 
the primary culprits. Because state bureaucracies in Uganda are infested by the regime’s systemic 
patron-based networking, the excessive exercise of authority is most likely to be present with overt 
impunity.  
How has a culturalist school characterised and explained state corruption? While debating the 
genealogy of corruption, some scholars have argued that it is a phenomenon in perpetuity or constant 
continuity. On the other hand, the rupture school has suggested that the emergence of corruption in 
African states and traditions resulted from a clear historic rapture that coincided with the importation of 
Western political culture through colonialism. The former lays claim for endogenous character and the 
latter claims the exogenous character of corruption (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006:27). Earlier 
rupturists, such as McMullan, have considered the pervasiveness of corruption and its construction in 
African states to be a result of the ‘clash of traditional values and customs with the modernising project’ 
(1961:186). He explained that although the customary exchanges of gifts equated to corruption in a 
modern cash economy in Ghana, the clash between such customs of traditional reciprocity, attitudes, 
connotes extortion. This is indicative of the transformation of corruption and the associated negative 
symbolisation of rules as a way of life. 
However, research from the early 1960s until the present day has credited the incentive structure as 
the driving force for corruption among state-service men. Scholars have contended that low salaries, 
poor supervision, weak laws, and poor economic situation in the country are the primary areas of focus 
in the search for answers regarding corruption, its causation, and persistence. Hope (2000) showed that 
the decade between 1975 and 1985 characterised poor purchasing power for public servants in Kenya, 
Sudan, Nigeria, and Somalia, among other Sub-Saharan African countries, thereby explaining the 
rampant corruption in these countries. There is a judicious agreement that Uganda suffers low incentive 
structures, thereby likely creating a deficit that provides grounds for corruption justifications. However, 
there are mega scandals involving the government’s big shots, who are rich enough to engage in 
corruption activities (risky behaviour). Therefore, the question regarding the factors motivating the 
Ugandan rich people into corruptibility may be answered by approaching their socialisation and 
resultant semiotics.   
Critiques of cultural schools have inclined to the new institutionalism advanced by North (1990). 
Although this theory is fairly recent, the conclusions of scholars of law and economics regarding state 
function resonate well with North’s theorisation. Rational choice scholars have noted that institutional 
structures provide incentives to rational individuals. Their explanations regarding the factors creating 
institutional change emphasise identifying where actors have achieved an institutional equilibrium. The 
rational institutional approach remains relevant for analysing police corruption regarding formal 
rationality and procedural regularity (Gofas and Hay 2010:79). When accessing the choice options for 
the corrupt, I noted that what the vast majority consider rational is a structure of subconscious elements 
prevalent in the environments they comfortably cluster, and not only a question of choice. During my 
tenure as a police detective, I had the choice and the legal instruments to fight corruption, but the system 
in which I worked demanded the status quo, wherein actions that are foreign to the normal method of 
doing business would not be tolerated. This situation was unrelated with the incentive structure.   
Although there is more evidence to support the incentive structure as stated by rational choice 
theorists, it is noteworthy that the discrepancy emerges from ignoring the practices within the social 
realms of state institutions. State officials, similar to people in any other sub-cultural group, do not have 
a stable set of preferences. Based on these practices and social realms, individuals cease to be passive 
recipients of the incentive structures but are instead involved in the interpretation of such incentive 
structures, as well as their social reality, as embedded. We must look beyond only incentive structures 
while analysing such complex situations as corruption and regime consolidation. Prince 1975, in his 
sociological research conducted on the Ghanaian public service, showed that even if the bureaucratic 
classes were considerably highly paid, as compared to the majority of the population, they continued to 
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bureaucracies—with the traditional patriarchies (the daddy—politics) could have invoked the cultural 
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the primary culprits. Because state bureaucracies in Uganda are infested by the regime’s systemic 
patron-based networking, the excessive exercise of authority is most likely to be present with overt 
impunity.  
How has a culturalist school characterised and explained state corruption? While debating the 
genealogy of corruption, some scholars have argued that it is a phenomenon in perpetuity or constant 
continuity. On the other hand, the rupture school has suggested that the emergence of corruption in 
African states and traditions resulted from a clear historic rapture that coincided with the importation of 
Western political culture through colonialism. The former lays claim for endogenous character and the 
latter claims the exogenous character of corruption (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006:27). Earlier 
rupturists, such as McMullan, have considered the pervasiveness of corruption and its construction in 
African states to be a result of the ‘clash of traditional values and customs with the modernising project’ 
(1961:186). He explained that although the customary exchanges of gifts equated to corruption in a 
modern cash economy in Ghana, the clash between such customs of traditional reciprocity, attitudes, 
connotes extortion. This is indicative of the transformation of corruption and the associated negative 
symbolisation of rules as a way of life. 
However, research from the early 1960s until the present day has credited the incentive structure as 
the driving force for corruption among state-service men. Scholars have contended that low salaries, 
poor supervision, weak laws, and poor economic situation in the country are the primary areas of focus 
in the search for answers regarding corruption, its causation, and persistence. Hope (2000) showed that 
the decade between 1975 and 1985 characterised poor purchasing power for public servants in Kenya, 
Sudan, Nigeria, and Somalia, among other Sub-Saharan African countries, thereby explaining the 
rampant corruption in these countries. There is a judicious agreement that Uganda suffers low incentive 
structures, thereby likely creating a deficit that provides grounds for corruption justifications. However, 
there are mega scandals involving the government’s big shots, who are rich enough to engage in 
corruption activities (risky behaviour). Therefore, the question regarding the factors motivating the 
Ugandan rich people into corruptibility may be answered by approaching their socialisation and 
resultant semiotics.   
Critiques of cultural schools have inclined to the new institutionalism advanced by North (1990). 
Although this theory is fairly recent, the conclusions of scholars of law and economics regarding state 
function resonate well with North’s theorisation. Rational choice scholars have noted that institutional 
structures provide incentives to rational individuals. Their explanations regarding the factors creating 
institutional change emphasise identifying where actors have achieved an institutional equilibrium. The 
rational institutional approach remains relevant for analysing police corruption regarding formal 
rationality and procedural regularity (Gofas and Hay 2010:79). When accessing the choice options for 
the corrupt, I noted that what the vast majority consider rational is a structure of subconscious elements 
prevalent in the environments they comfortably cluster, and not only a question of choice. During my 
tenure as a police detective, I had the choice and the legal instruments to fight corruption, but the system 
in which I worked demanded the status quo, wherein actions that are foreign to the normal method of 
doing business would not be tolerated. This situation was unrelated with the incentive structure.   
Although there is more evidence to support the incentive structure as stated by rational choice 
theorists, it is noteworthy that the discrepancy emerges from ignoring the practices within the social 
realms of state institutions. State officials, similar to people in any other sub-cultural group, do not have 
a stable set of preferences. Based on these practices and social realms, individuals cease to be passive 
recipients of the incentive structures but are instead involved in the interpretation of such incentive 
structures, as well as their social reality, as embedded. We must look beyond only incentive structures 
while analysing such complex situations as corruption and regime consolidation. Prince 1975, in his 
sociological research conducted on the Ghanaian public service, showed that even if the bureaucratic 
classes were considerably highly paid, as compared to the majority of the population, they continued to 
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use of force (state violence) to retain power is a type of corruption that most regimes in the world have 
refused to confess guilt toward. 
When the patrons remain in power for a long period, their cronies build the web of protection around 
them, which makes it impossible for outsiders to penetrate or dismantle the corrupt institution. It is 
usually common knowledge that in politics, such as these, opposition to the regime stems from within 
(other than some exemptions). The executive—president—maintains authority through personal 
patronage, rather than through constructive ideology or the law; however, some patron–client 
relationships may be constructed by shared political ideology, such as revolutionary patriotism in 
Uganda today. The relationships between loyalty and dependency pervade a formal political system. 
Whether in classic patriarchy—wherein the right to rule is ascribed—or in modern patriarchy—wherein
dominance is enforced—the pivotal mindset works to consolidate the patrons’ rule over others. The 
distinction between private and public interests is intentionally blurred. The power to curtail corruption 
resides in the ability of regimes to exercise self-restraint.
In its relationship with regime consolidation, state corruption cannot be discussed as merely a rational 
choice. The formation of patriarchs also involves the uniqueness associated with the selection of clients 
suitable for a trust network. Although it is valid to claim that motivation and incentive structures, such 
as reciprocal relations, resource allocation, and elite dominance, could best help to understand state 
corruption or other forms of deviance that include gratification, we must observe the state formation, its 
predatory characteristics, and the normative tendencies that emanate from the routinisation of state 
function as the primary supporting explanatory grounds for incentive structures’ claims. Why are some 
nation-states increasingly prone to state corruption? The level of state development processes and the 
effects of the routines will help us answer that question, although this may require another research 
agenda. Post-colonial states in Africa are likely to be increasingly prone to corruption, compared with 
more developed countries in Europe and elsewhere, because of the nation-state maturity variations. 
However, I consider the incentive structure a puzzle piece in the context of fragile African nation-states, 
such as Uganda, faced with structural violence. Rationality and its interaction with normative political 
structures may remain the best explanatory ground for state corruption.  
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and patronage, with the new forms of government contributed to the pervasiveness of corruption. 
Traditional values collided with modern methods, thus exemplifying the notions of reciprocity exhibited 
in gift exchanges, the prestige of having dependents and servants, social appreciation of generosity, 
respect for elders, and the preference for personal contact in the spheres of public administration (Werlin
1972).  
These traditional values could have translated directly in the modern state function as severe systemic 
grafts and normalised scandals. However, caution must be exercised when assessing these opposing 
schools. The line between normal societal customs and the manifestations of corruption is faint. African 
reciprocal traditions, intermarriages, and power relations existed in almost every society, but have not 
been emphasised as the cause of corruption. These schools of thought are perceived as having a
condescending attitude toward precolonial states. There are some extents of the past histories deep-
rooted in kingships’ ancestral habits and interactions that at face value may not have translated into bad 
and selfish intentions amounting to corruption (similar to every human society). For example, the king 
of Buganda or Ankole assuming that he is only a receiver of peasants’ harvests and not a giver in a 
reciprocal relationship is a shared element of domination among monarchs everywhere.
Finally, I argue that state corruption—which is perceived as thriving in legal-rational institutions—
is a social activity, not only regulated and in accordance with complex rules and regulations, but also 
tightly controlled by tacit codes and norms (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006). However, it is 
important that although we build fantasies around the literature on corruption both as a cultural object 
of analysis and organised around incentive structures, we ought to connect it to its role in the political 
regime consolidation matrix. Future studies must focus on understanding the play of the Weberian 
bureaucracy in parochial civic culture and how this operates in combination with other aspects of the 
regime consolidation mechanism.  
7. Conclusion 
Corruption is a notable factor in African governmentality. Widespread predation and greed serve to 
express the social struggles surrounding the hegemonic quest for and production of the state in Africa. 
An understanding of state corruption is inherent in the foundations upon which the state-making process 
was/is possible in this part of the world. Then, if the state-making process is in itself an organised crime, 
it may be equally valid that the products of the state reflect its formation. Although (African) nation-
state formation was by and large a European instigation, the dynamics inherent in the new states not 
only adopted the bureaucracy of state administration and associated bottlenecks, but also could not resist 
the traces of patrimonial politics of dominance that existed earlier. The choice between being and not 
being corrupt is largely determined by the toleration of opposing views to the regime’s existence. The 
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